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Finding the Essential:
A Phenomenological Look at Hal Hartley's No Such Thing

Introduction
Humanity appears to have an inherent desire to project our collective
unconscious into and onto unexplainable phenomena.

In doing so, we are

forever distancing and delaying what we wish not to confront. Hal Hartley's No
Such Thing entertains this desire for projection and presents a less transcendent
and more embodied form of these phenomena. He offers the viewer a cinematic
meditation suggesting that in a materialist age our belief in the supernatural
fades in importance; and thus, our collective unconscious has less of a need for
archetypes of otherworldly proportions. This need for projection, however, does
not evaporate. Rather, our unconscious desires and fears become transferred to
more identifiable and recognizable phenomena and personae. The analogy to a
shift in belief from a wizardly God of the Old Testament and the earthly Christ of
the New Testament is illustrative of this transference. It is not as though the
murkiness of our unconscious has changed; rather, the entities on which we cast
our faith and fears take on a form more coherent with our socio-historical
condition. In the case of Hartley’s most recent film, it is a society numbed by
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information overload with which these archetypes must cohere, a world where
nothing is shocking. Hartley's take on society may be grim (although fairly
accurate) but he does provide us with a savior: a savior of existential, as well as
transcendental significance.

It will help to deepen our understanding of No Such Thing if we revisit Paul
Schrader's 1 central thesis in Transcendental Style in Film. This essay will do so,
and then propose a reconfiguration of transcendence in film, applying
phenomenological categories to Hartley's thought-provoking cinematic essay.
This is not an exercise devised to deconstruct or debunk Schrader's thesis.
Rather, what follows should be regarded as an expansion and extrapolation of
his account of the transcendent, and how this is figured in cinematic forms. The
need for such an expansion is clear: if we remain tied to Schrader's definitions of
the Transcendental, there are key aspects of the film (such as the agency of its
characters, its narrative progression, its assertion of the alogical, and the
subjectivity of the archetype offered therein) that come close to, but nonetheless
fall short of, his strictly "Holy" definition of the transcendent. I will begin with
an overview of Schrader's main points, followed by a reconfiguration of these, to
demonstrate the fruitfulness of adopting an analysis of Hartley's film drawn
from existential phenomenology.

3
I have chosen a work by Hal Hartley for distinct reasons. Hartley has created an
oeuvre that, on various levels, attempts to get at the essence of ideas, characters,
and social structures.

His work is not profoundly religious, but his films

repeatedly place characters within a web of philosophical and theological
questions, without over-intellectualizing. He seems to imply that puzzlement
over existence and society are questions we all wrestle with, but Hartley’s
characters just do so more openly than most. Other directors might also be seen
as engaging in this kind of re-analysis of the transcendental in cinema (David
Lynch, Peter Weir, Andrei Tarkovsky, and Lars Von Trier immediately spring to
mind). However, in order to restrict my discussion to only one film, I’ve chosen
Hartley and his most recent production.

Hartley’s work lends itself for

phenomenological analysis for several reasons, but most prominently because his
characters are continually searching for self-meaning, questioning the bounds
(and rules) of relationships, and (in this film in particular) exploring the nature of
existence, faith, exploitation, and the miraculous. In addition, characters within
his films are rarely allowed to emote, fixing the film itself as an expressionperception of the human condition, an aspect of phenomenology of extreme
importance to the film experience 2 . Finally, Hartley’s cinematic “minimalism” is
instrumental to his continual search for the essence of his characters and the
situations they find themselves in. This minimalism, this drive for the essential,
is exemplified by a rarified use of camera work, editing, sound, music, and
dialogue, that is both cinematically and philosophically poetic.
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Schrader on Transcendental Style in Cinema
Paul Schrader's captivating analysis of the films of Ozu, Bresson, and Dreyer
revolves around a central concept: the Transcendent. Semantically, Schrader
defines this term as simply "a general representative filmic form which expresses
the Transcendent." 3 Such films embody, according to Schrader, an expression of
"the Holy". 4 His critical method supposes two things: First, the existence of
hierophanies, expressions of the transcendent in the world 5 (here he makes an
association to Eliade's 6 7 work on comparative religions); and second, that even
divergent cultures share common representative artistic forms 8 (on this latter
point his association is aligned with the artistic analysis carried out by
Wolfflin 9 , 10 ). These two critical points are carried forward to discuss how some
cinematic forms likewise can express the transcendent (or Holy), and that these
representations suggest a kind of universal homogeneity.

Indeed, Schrader

regards this style as having universal qualities, although he does account for
personal and cultural influences as to how this is represented according to
different directors. However, he argues that "their similarities are stylistic, and
represent a unified reflection of the Transcendent on film." 11

Schrader breaks down expressions of the transcendent according to three
different thematic forms:
1.

The existence or presence of a Holy or Divine
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2.

Acts expressing something emanating from The Transcendent (i.e.
miracles, divine communion, etc.)

3.

The experience of transcendence (a character's spiritual path
leading toward some form of enlightenment or sanctification).

All of the above may manifest in literal filmic forms, in terms of characters and
narrative progression. But, Schrader is quick to note that stylistic elements such
as mise-en-scene, cinematography, and editing can all contribute to the overall
"look" and "feel" of the transcendental style in film.

There are two other points raised by Schrader that are deserving of preliminary
discussion and analysis. These pertain to human experiences of phenomena and
(in our first analogy to Husserlian phenomenology) how we must learn to strip
away epistemologies, scientific theories, and ontologies, if we are to get at "the
things themselves". Conventional interpretations of the transcendental style in
cinema can often frustrate viewers if they are unable to put their natural attitude
"out of play". As Schrader observes, "Transcendental style seeks to maximize the
mystery of existence; it eschews all conventional interpretations of reality:
realism, naturalism, psychologism, romanticism, expressionism, impressionism,
and, finally, rationalism." 12

Applying this to the Monster in No Such Thing,

transcendental style would maintain his existence as a "mystery".
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However, if we move from Schrader's theories and compare a similar statement
from Ihde's 13 discussion on interpretation and description in his 1986 treatise
Experimental Phenomenology, we may come closer to understanding this
character's significance within the film. As Ihde has stated, "Hermeneutic rules
establish a strictly descriptive interpretation of experience, which eschews
explanation and all hypothetical constructions relying upon, presupposing or
seeking to establish accounts of experience that go behind or above
experience.” 14 Therefore, explanation of the "mysterious" or "unexplainable" (the
three miracles, the Monster himself) within Hartley's film, requires, first and
foremost, an accounting for what is experienced based on an interpretation free
of preconceived notions. During the press conference, for example, the Monster
is subjected to a string of questions that presume a mythological nature to his
persona, when in fact, his "monstrousness" is of a very different kind than that of
fairy tales. The reporters and scientists fail to observe these differences, precisely
because of their unwillingness (or inability) to bracket their projected
expectations.

In the case of Hartley's film, it is not embodying "the mystery of existence" (as
Schrader might see it) that propels the characters and story, but rather a
profound meditation on the nature of existence. The randomness of events (such
as an unprovoked punch in the stomach or a plane crashing into the sea, or for
that matter, there being only one survivor) may in fact eschew conventional
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interpretations of reality, but these events exist as phenomena in and among
themselves. They are neither provided an explanation, nor do they seem to
demand one. Rather, their significance is in what they are (i.e. that they exist, not
why they occurred). And in this Hartley (perhaps unwittingly) offers such events
to the spectator as phenomena reduced to their essence. We as spectators are
invited (if we are so inclined) to determine the reasons or "logic" behind such
events. But we must be cautious not to invest such interpretations with our
biases.

This is particularly important considering what is characteristic of

Hartley's manner of filmmaking, because such events frequently do not stand out
so much as punctuations, but flow as part of the narrative progression. Hartley
is committed to cutting past the superfluous in film, which is his way of
operating outside the assumption that there is often "a certain way [i.e. "natural
attitude"] things are done" 15 in cinema. By not making such events out to be
spectacular, the spectator is expected to take these as "natural": People do get
punched, airplanes do crash. While open to interpretation, we must be reminded
that it is the experience of such phenomena that remains primary, especially so
with films addressing themes of transcendence.

Taken from another vantage point, Schrader upholds that films which express
transcendental style do so by eliminating "elements which are primarily
expressive of human experience." 16 He goes on to conclude that "Transcendental
style…transforms experience into a repeatable ritual which can be repeatedly
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transcended." 17 There are two issues to deal with here; first, human experience is
integral to the encounter with phenomena. But the expression of this experience,
in many cinematic occasions, can be equated to what Husserl 18 calls our "natural
attitude" towards phenomena, if indeed we go no further than a first-hand
interpretation.

In the case of transcendental cinema, expression of what is

individual in human experience is eliminated so as to point towards the
transcendental qualities of the phenomenological encounter.

Therefore,

experience is signified as repeatable, pre-intellectual, pre-cultural, pre-reflective.
Hartley's films likewise narrow the boundaries of human expression in order for
the experience itself to remain significant. Hartley has commented upon his
manner of directing actors, which does not allow them to provide any emotional
pitch to their dialogue, avoiding such punctuations and theatrical indulgences; in
his words, he prefers to let the film as a whole "have a personality". 19 In short,
Hartley finds individual expression sloppy because it can too easily obscure the
essence of phenomena, and thus, detract from the overall thrust and spirit of the
film.

Before I provide a synopsis of Hartley’s film, let me first outline my
reconfiguration of Schrader's analysis of the transcendental in film. I deviate
slightly from Schrader's term “Transcendental style”, and opt for the term
"transcendence"; noting that this does not suggest a particular style of
filmmaking, but is rather a global characteristic of certain films, and thus
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becomes a heuristic means for critiquing and deconstructing character and
narrative elements.

Re-configuring Schrader's Transcendental Style
The forms of transcendence that I will use to expand Schrader's terms are a slight
variation on his original thesis: these include
1.

The Transcendent (or Holy): refigured as the Subjective Archetype

2.

Spiritual Transcendence: refigured as Anarcho-Catholicism

3.

Transcendental Acts: refigured as Agency of the Saint

Items 1,2, and 3 will be compared to Schrader's original three definitions, and
(using Hartley's film) I will show how the proposed reconfiguration of these
forms of transcendence provide a more insightful and appropriate analysis of
transcendence in film.

Schrader's previous point regarding the irrational and abstract provides a good
lead-in to a discussion of Hartley's film. No Such Thing is ripe with what could
commonly be regarded as obscure and illogical plot elements. But, I will argue
that a reading of the film from this position would be missing something of great
significance to how the film is constructed thematically. Abstract and illogical do
not do justice to certain plot elements within Hartley's film, but rather these
elements should be seen as alogical (namely, that illogical would suggest a
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certain degree of sloppiness or authorial indulgence, while alogical implies that
the director and film are not even attempting to subscribe to a system of logic,
and therefore the rationale and reasoning falls outside of common notions of
what "makes sense" or is "logical"). Hartley's manner of filmmaking is often
regarded as "minimalist".

This comes closer to the point, but still does not

account for the rationale for the choice of style here.

I prefer to see his

"minimalism" as a means of getting past the superfluous, a means which Hartley
himself has identified 20 as getting at the "essence" of things. And this is akin to
the

epoché,

or

bracketing

reductions,

which

are

characteristic

of

phenomenological analysis.

Synopsis of No Such Thing
No Such Thing is a story that involves a monster, a young woman, and the mass
media.

It entertains themes of forgiveness, compassion, trust, faith and

sanctification, while providing a biting commentary on society run amok,
ineffectual and totalitarian governmental control, the often inhumane nature of
scientific inquiry, and the mass media's relentless appetite for sensationalism. In
the course of the story a young girl named Beatrice experiences three "miracles",
and thus takes on a "saint-like" persona. The Monster, whose only wish is to die,
is exploited by the media and quickly transformed into a valuable commodity.
Eagerly scavenging for headlines, aggressively constructing a glitzy exposé
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revolving around the Monster and Beatrice; recasting the unassuming young
lady as a sexy ingenue, and subjecting the Monster to a media onslaught,
Beatrice's employers (represented by a chain smoking Helen Mirren) finally
pawn him off to scientific experimentations. In fact, it could be suggested that the
"real" monster in the film does not appear to be the beast who breathes fire, but
rather the media types who conspire against him.

The Monster is indestructible and ageless (although at the outset of the film he
admits he's "not the monster [he] used to be"). His physique and demeanor are
gargantuan though nearly human, except for the horns above his brow and his
reptilian complexion.

At the beginning of the film we find him in mid-

monologue, hiding out in Northern Iceland, reclusive and in utter misery. He
sends out a call for help using an audio recorder, booty from a news crew that
previously had came to interview him (and who were subsequently "torn to
pieces"). In this message he presents an ultimatum to humanity: He wants to die,
to be killed (and thus, in his eyes, "saved"), and if humans are unwilling to help,
him, then he'll be forced to go on a rampage and kill every last one of us
(seemingly, humanity is the source of his misery). The message is received by
Beatrice, who works for a large New York City news agency, under the direction
of a brooding despot. Despite her lowly position within the news department
(e.g. answering phones, making coffee, etc.), Beatrice requests to be the one sent
to Iceland to investigate, but her real motivation lies neither in substantiating the
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"monster story" nor in attempting to help the monster. Rather, she wants to
discover what has happened to her fiancé, who was a member of the missing
news crew (and, unbeknownst to her, had been slaughtered).

Before Beatrice even boards the plane to Iceland, she encounters domestic
terrorism, arms smuggling, a demolition crew, and a contorted junky
experiencing violent withdrawal who assaults and mugs her. She barely makes
her flight to Iceland. However, Beatrice's journey (which is classically obtuse) is
an even more perilous one. Her trip is circuitously rerouted via Brussels and
Lisbon – and before reaching Brussels her plane crashes into the sea. Everyone
on board perishing, leaving her as the sole survivor.

This marks the first

"miracle" that Beatrice undergoes.

Beatrice may have survived the plane crash, but she is badly injured and even
temporarily paralyzed from the neck down. After politely refusing to give her
boss an exclusive story on the “drama” of the plane crash, Beatrice decides to test
her luck further by subjecting herself to a highly experimental form of intensive
surgery, while under the care of a sympathetic doctor at a Reykjavik hospital.
The surgery is done in order to restore her ability to walk, but it involves little or
no anesthetic (hence its experimental and rather dangerous nature). The agony
of the surgery is represented through Hartley's traditional mastery of cinematic
minimalism (her scream is muted, quickly followed by a flash of white light),
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making her suffering and tremendous pain all the more moving to the audience.
Beatrice survives this operation (a second miracle), and within six months
continues on her journey towards the monster; at first by car and cane, and then
by horseback and foot, across the stark landscape of Iceland. In a telling moment
(that further suggests the saintly nature of Beatrice) as she leaves the hospital, the
young children of Reykjavik surround her in amazement, gently vying to touch
her blonde hair, in an effort to make physical contact with the embodiment of a
miracle. Beatrice's recovery from the operation is nothing short of miraculous; it
restores her unscathed and able to walk amongst the living.

The third miracle Beatrice undergoes is surviving her confrontation with the
Monster. The Monster's reputation and appetite for killing has already been
established, so when Beatrice first encounters him, it is not so much a "maiden
within the monster's lair" type of situation (which might be expected from other
directors). Instead, their first encounter is redolent with Hartley's rapid-fire and
staccato dialogue; Beatrice and the Monster each probe one another verbally as to
who they are, what are they doing here, and where they hope to go, etc. Soon
the Monster states that even he is impressed that she's still alive (meaning he
hasn't killed her, for the audience, this line has double meaning, for we have
already witnessed two other events which she should not have survived).
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Gradually, though tenuously, an element of trust emerges between the Monster
and Beatrice. He needs her to help him find an eccentric scientist (Dr. Artaud,
apparently the only one who can put the monster out of his misery), but her
motivation lies less in something she needs from him (she is already famous
from the encounter), but more an expression of compassion. He asked for her
help, so being the sensitive and empathetic person she is, she eventually decides
to help him, but only after he adheres to her request that he promise not to kill
anyone throughout their journey. Though his response is characteristic ("You
can't expect me to go out there [into the world] and not kill anyone!" 21 ), he sticks
to his promise throughout.

The two embark for New York City, and having already contacted the media
matriarch, they arrange for a secured arrival in Manhattan. The manner of their
arrival foreshadows his celebrity status, complete with crowds, groupies, flash
cameras, and news reporters. Once in Manhattan, the Monster and Beatrice are
immediately exploited as the latest celebrity couple, and the Monster is
predictably treated as no more than a curious peculiarity, a hip freak of nature.
Their search for Dr. Artaud is delayed in favor of a press conference, and during
his interview the Monster has some thought-provoking things to say about
himself, and more importantly, about humanity.
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"What made you morons so damned adaptable?" The Monster calmly reflects
upon his previous inquiries into such matters, which in the past has compelled
him to literally "tear us apart", but upon cracking a human subject open, the
monster found nothing of significance; much to his disappointment, he
discovered only a crude display of "blood, guts, and shit, same as everything
else. Pointless, absurd. Just another fucking accident." This assessment of our
human condition points to one thing; that physiologically and anatomically our
species is no different from the other life-forms that share our eco-systems. What
makes us "so damned adaptable" may be our cognitive ability to conceptualize
and project ideas, thoughts, fears and desires, for doing so allows us to distance
and delay the need for confronting what troubles us. Of course, this cognitive
means of projection has its more immediate advantages for survival, such as the
capability of our hominid ancestors to "plan ahead" for securing their next meal.
But Hartley is more concerned with the projection of our unconscious and the
(literal) forms this may take. He puts a curious spin on this idea which is
reminiscent of certain theories associated with quantum physics 22 ; namely, that
the mere act of thinking of something gives it an existence. Hartley carries this
further to suggest that ideas, fears, concepts, etc. can take on material form, and
therefore exercise affectivity in the "real" world; hence, the undeniable
materialization and a highly animated Monster.
"Let's get right down to the main issue here:
A monster, in this day and age?
I mean, don't you just find that – you know, like irrelevant?"
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News Reporter

The reporter's rather frank and direct question is seen as a challenge to the
Monster's very existence; the snide "what are you doing here?" kind of question
that might be asked of an uninvited guest at an upscale cocktail party. The
question signals modern society's waning need for the supernatural, particularly
striking in a Western culture obsessed with materialism. The age of monsters
and gods has given way to more practical, observable phenomena. But it's not
that we no longer believe in monsters, but that they have lost significance within
our materialist world: As the news producer asks rather dryly, upon her first
meeting with the Monster; "So, you're the monster, I guess." As if to be saying
"you're the monster…so what?". Thus, his existence is less monstrous and more
anomalous, if not trivial. In light of our discontinued belief in the supernatural,
however, the death of monsters is not so easily accomplished. This one’s angry,
and he's not just going to go away.

Immediately following his encounter with the press, instead of being taken to the
kindly Dr. Artaud, the Monster is escorted to the lab of an insensitive, almost
robot-like scientist, where he is subsequently tortured; all in the name of
objective scientific enquiry. Thereafter the Monster, helpless – for he honors his
promise not to kill anyone – is released into the world where he is subjected to
various random assaults and humiliations at the hands of a cruel and taunting
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public.

Eventually, through the help of Beatrice and a few sympathetic

accomplices, he returns to Iceland to be destroyed.

But his destruction (realizing for himself, that he is only a materialization of
humanity's fears) may suggest only that his time has past; the age of monsters
and superstition giving way to a more recognizable form and manifestation of
belief. This is where the scenario becomes a little cloudy. Hartley himself has
stated 23 that the monster "symbolizes nothing". But it is tempting to see these
two characters as having significant biblical implications. On the one hand, we
can regard the Monster as standing in for the God of the Old Testament
(exhibiting the arcane attributes of a destroyer, a grand manipulator and
indestructible entity wielding supernatural powers), while Beatrice may
represent a more earthly form of divinity, much like the Savior of the New
Testament (corporeal, yet exhibiting the divine qualities of innocence,
compassion, forgiveness, faith, and the grace to survive various trials/miracles).
If the monster has become disenchanted with humanity, Beatrice embraces the
potential good in all beings (human or otherwise), thus exhibiting an extreme
measure of faith in humanity, despite the corruption, exploitation, and violence
characteristic of early 21st century society.

"Matter is one, yes of course. That's easy.
But you see, at different densities.
Heavy and light. It can interpenetrate."
Dr. Artaud
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In the last sequence of the film, the Monster is "destroyed" through the aid of Dr.
Artaud and his quizzical "matter eradicator". According to the eccentric doctor's
theories, all things have matter – even concepts, beliefs, etc. – however, these
exist at different densities.

It is presumed that the Monster's existence is

therefore a materialization of our beliefs (or more appropriately, our fears). He is
a concept made material. But it appears that a waning of belief in his existence is
not enough to terminate him. And this is where a pinch of phenomenology can
aid in analysis. To the Monster, his existence is solipsistic, and therefore, his
termination requires the recognition of his own subjectivity. Following Husserl,
the idea of self is only possible in reference to an other. If the Monster is to cease
to exist, then he must be made aware that his existence itself is no more than a
projection. At this point in history, Hartley seems to suggest humanity no longer
needs to believe in monsters and myths, that we live in an age obsessed only
with materiality, the observable, and the immediate.

Through the recognition of his own subjectivity as merely a projection, the
Monster attains his goal of non-existence. Yet, due to some remarkably quick
and stylish editing and lighting, Hartley hints at a transference from the Monster
to Beatrice; and in doing so suggests that she may embody humanity's salvation.
The age of monsters is behind us, as is the age of faith and belief in what we
cannot see. And within the age of materialism, if there is to be any salvation, it is
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through miracles we can actually witness (such as the trials/portents associated
with Beatrice). Perhaps the materialist age requires a material beacon, not a
conceptual one? The final sequence of the film rapidly cuts between the Monster
and Beatrice, suggesting that his existence does not simply fade, but converges
with Beatrice; she absorbs all that has been projected upon him.

As the

projection of our fears ceases to take on the image of monsters, such projections
(along with our hopes and desires) are put upon the existential and benevolent
Beatrice. In so doing, she assumes a similar, though more corporeally-rooted,
transcendental, archetypal essence. Hartley's final image in the film draws from
Christian iconography to underscore this point: Beatrice in close up, blonde hair
flowing, eyes crystalline, a devastatingly beautiful and tranquil face bathed in
white light – numinous.

The Transcendental Refigured as The Subjective Archetype
Hartley himself has described the monster as a being who is simply in search of
his own purpose. 24 He does not know why he exists, just that he does. Further,
his only desire is to be put to rest. These two things hold great significance to
understanding his character: that while he may sport weathered horns above his
brow, he is less the terrible, thoughtless violent monster that his reputation
speaks of, but more the contemplative, psychologically tormented being who just
wants to know why he's here. In the end, he simply wants to be destroyed;
which posits him as closer to a mortal than a supernatural phenomenon.
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Contrary

to

Schrader's

definition,

Hartley's

film

suggests

that

"The

Transcendental" does not reside in some heavenly or divine locale outside of the
main characters, but exists within them. Therefore, it is necessary to refigure
Schrader's definition, and situate (or look for) the transcendental as a quality that
exists within the two main characters of the Monster and Beatrice. To see it
properly in this light, neither the Monster nor Beatrice represent the
Transcendental in any classical sense, but rather are existential beings who
exhibit transcendental qualities (subjective and existential archetypes). I have
suggested above that Hartley has adorned both of these characters with these
qualities, and, in this connection, character and plot elements that Schrader
might posit as "Holy" can be better understood if subjected to phenomenological
description.

"I want to die but I can't. I'm indestructible. I'm sorry, it's not my fault;
must be yours.
I know of no god who could be that cruel.
I know of no God…unless, of course, I am God.
But then what difference would that make? I'd still be fucked."
The Monster

The Monster is apparently indestructible and ageless (well, almost – as we can
presume his termination during the final sequence of the film). Yet, he is no
more than a projection. He has become what we have intended him to be as an
animation, an archetype generated by our unconscious. Without going beyond a
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transcendental explanation for his existence – as Ihde 25 has critiqued of
transcendental phenomenology – for the scientist and the news producer within
the film, the Monster confirms them in their narrowly rationalistic metaphysics.
That is, the Monster is encountered as verifying their preconceptions of who he
is. If indeed he is no more than a projection of humanity's fears, this makes him
akin to the monsters and deities we have created out of a need to provide
explanations for the unknown. He is an anthro-projection, God-like, but his
existence remains contingent upon our beliefs, and therefore his "divinity" is
subjective, and not omnipresent and eternal.
I remember when you were young. Pond scum.
Just another ooze at the edge of the local warm water.
I was there. I saw you evolve.”
The Monster

Following Ihde's discussion of Husserlian phenomenology 26 , the transcendental
is an "I" which presumably lies above and outside the correlation between noesis
and noema (the experience and that which is experienced), rather than being
constituted reflexively within the correlation.

The Monster assumes a

transcendental state – an “ideal observer” as Ihde 27 might refer to him – because
he is projected as such. But as a projection he is part of this equation. Therefore,
re-inserting him into the correlation between noema and noesis amounts to no
less than his self-reflection. His self-reflection being a projection – of an idea
made physical – the realization of this conditional existence results in his
extinction. By means of the "matter eradicator" the Monster is subjected to what
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Ihde has called "the mirror of the world". In this position, the Monster is forced
to take on a reflexive turn: to see himself within the correlation between noema
and noesis and not outside of this.

We encounter the Monster and are provided no explanation for his existence: he
just does. His supernatural qualities are not explained. During the Monster's
subjugation to experimentation, the lab scientist states that since science can’t
explain his existence, then he simply does not exist. Yet, there he is, howling,
strapped to an operating table, his body wired up to an elaborate display of
technology. Hartley seems to be alluding to the "blindness” of science; that in its
experimentations to determine the nature of things, it misses what is right in
front of its eyes: A sentient, living, (fire)breathing being. If we follow Husserl's
phenomenological reductions, then we must delay our desire for scientific
theories in order to observe the phenomenon for how it appears to us. Only
Beatrice and Dr. Artaud are able to encounter and account for the Monster for
what he is; a sorrowful and irritable creature in pain. The two scientists in the
film (Dr. Artaud and the lab scientist) exist as an interesting contrast on how the
Monster is encountered. As I stated above, the laboratory scientist refuses to
"see" the Monster.

He is too deeply immersed in his technology.

As a

counterpoint, Dr. Artaud (who incidentally has impaired optical vision, signified
by his spectacles with lenses of tremendous girth) is able to encounter the
Monster as a sentient being. It can be said that the Monster is both saved by and
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tortured by science. But it is not science itself that imposes these ends upon him;
rather it is the individual characters who practice such endeavors. Hartley, in his
sympathetic depiction of the "mad" Dr. Artaud, seems to indicate that if science
is to be made humane, it must be willing to think unscientifically from time to
time. To do so, one must encounter phenomena with methods that respond to
the phenomena themselves.

Spiritual Transcendence: refigured as Anarcho-Catholicism
In terms of narrative structure and cinematic stylization, Schrader draws from
Maritain's 28 , 29 concepts of "sparse" and "abundant" means in art and applies
these to the transcendental style. As Schrader uses these terms, abundant means
are those associated with practicality, physical needs and goods, and sensual
feelings. Sparse means, conversely, are those cinematic elements concerned with
the domain and cultivation of the spirit. He notes, however, that sparse means
are not ordered toward tangible success, but toward elevation of the spirit.
Therefore, we can regard these as plot elements that either contain a corporeal or a
spiritual significance. And, further, Schrader states that the gradual shift from
abundant to sparse means should be a clear sign of spiritual progression: “One
way to determine the ‘spiritual quality’ of a cinematic style, therefore, is to
examine the manner in which it disposes of its inherent abundant means and
substitutes sparse means." 30

However, Hartley provides the inverse of this

spiritual equation, what I call Anarcho-Catholicism.
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Hartley's playful reinterpretation and recasting of the "saintly path", through the
character of Beatrice, provides a reversal in the progression from abundant to
sparse means. In doing so Beatrice presents a similarly sparse, though slightly
different representation of the Transcendent as the Monster. She appears mortal;
she sleeps, drinks, smokes, copulates, etc., but all the same, retains Christ-like
qualities.

She enters into and emerges from three miraculous situations.

However, it would be simplistic and misguided to regard these miracles as signs
of divine intervention.

Rather, they are illustrative of Beatrice's ability to

encounter phenomena existentially; i.e., in a pre-judgmental, pre-reflective
fashion. The three miracles are linked, not random; one is the result of the
previous, etc. Further, they are experiences necessary for Beatrice – trials meant
to illustrate an unfolding of something inherent within her. It would appear,
therefore, that subjecting the progression of Beatrice's character to Schrader’s
means of analysis would consider such corporeal acts as signifying her gradual
corruption. Rather, what Hartley shows is not the perversion of Beatrice, but the
inversion of Schrader’s sparse and abundant means as a route toward
sanctification.

Beatrice first appears dressed in a rather plain manner; her pony-tailed hair and
frumpy, gray dress deny her womanly figure. As the story unfolds, her clothing
progressively accentuates her attractive form and her behavior becomes more
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"enworlded" (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking and getting inebriated, firing a
pistol, having sex). It is undeniable that her character progression is an inversion
of Schrader's predicted path toward sainthood: Beatrice moves from sparse to
abundant means.

In doing so, Beatrice undergoes and enters into trying

experiences that are necessary for her to assume a transcendental state: one
exhibiting both transcendent and existential characteristics. Beatrice ultimately
exists as a divine being of human proportions; a living, breathing individual that
has undergone miraculous trials, and emerged unscathed, retaining the
benevolent qualities of faith and virtue. What might be regarded as corruptive
activities are, on the contrary, experiences that fortify her corporeal and spiritual
essence. And, in this way, Hartley's depiction of her character progression is
what I identify as a form of anarcho-catholicism; suggesting that the saintly route
need not be shrouded in asceticism; on the contrary, through encountering the
world in an existential manner, the virtues of Beatrice's character become all the
more remarkable and deserving of praise.

Transcendental Acts: refigured as Agency of the Saint
Hartley provides another inversion of the Transcendental style in film, in that he
denies the possibility of divine intervention on the world of his characters (an
apparent disavowal of the concept of hierophanies). Rather, Beatrice, along her
saintly route, encounters adverse conditions and successfully emerges due to her
ability to put her "natural attitude" out of play in the various trying situations she
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encounters.

Her character has been described 31 as not naïve, but wisely

innocent, indicating that her experience of phenomena and characters is one that
is advantageously pre-intellectual, pre-reflective, without judgement or fear.
Therefore, it can be argued, that her character is not necessarily "blessed" (as it is
even suggested at one point in the film). Her perseverance is not the result of
protection from above, but from her own non-judgmental and pre-reflective
attitude and behavior. Surviving the plane crash may take this to an extreme,
but her survival of the operation and her confrontation with the Monster
demonstrate that her endurance emanates from the existential quality of openly
encountering phenomena for what they are.

Beatrice can also be seen as performing a series of "reductions" reminiscent (and
illustrative) of Husserl's phenomenology, in exhibiting an attitude free of sociocultural prejudices. She is subjected to several warnings about the Monster's
diabolical ferociousness, but nonetheless sustains her resolve, thus refusing to be
spooked by all of the fear, paranoia, and even skeletal evidence and firebreathing threats made apparent to her.

In their initial confrontation she

encounters him not as monster, but simply as other. And by not projecting
psychological or societal fears upon him, he (these) cannot harm her.

So, in the end, Beatrice does not seem to behave according to some divine code or
logic, rather it is her ability to encounter people and the world alogically;
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innocent but with wisdom. It is difficult to regard her as a person traversing a
spiritual path, at least according to Schrader's definitions. Though it appears that
she assumes a saintly persona at the end of the film, in essence, she has changed
little. She is always already open, trusting, compassionate, etc. It is perhaps the
world (we can only hope) that will encounter her differently; see her as more
than a servant girl (to the news producer), more than a princess and "ingenue"
(as a media icon), and in the end as a sort of savior (as I've suggested earlier, the
parallel shift between the Monster and Beatrice to the God of the Old Testament
and the Savior of the New).

Final Thoughts
Throughout the film, both Beatrice and the spectator are confronted with
seemingly inexplicable phenomena. But Beatrice refuses the temptation (or gut
reaction) to simply "explain" the Monster away; rather, she manages to encounter
him pre-reflectively. Similarly no explanation is offered to the spectator for the
Monster's existence; he is taken "as is", that is, as a brute fact. He breathes fire,
period.

Beatrice survives three miraculous brushes with death, period.

Explanation would cloud these plot elements. Thus, the film spectator must
encounter the same anomalies as Beatrice does – alogically (outside of logical
constructs) – in order to move forward. And this is typical of Hartley's style as a
filmmaker and screenwriter. He only puts in what is necessary to get to the
essence of his characters and scenarios. It may be minimalism, but I would
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suggest that this brings us back to one of the functional attributes of Schrader's
thesis, particularly his discussion of "sparse" means in cinema, and how these
lend a certain transcendental quality to cinematic meditations on the nature and
bounds of existence.

The interplay between sparse and abundant means in film, and particularly
within transcendental film, can be used to reinforce expressions of the
transcendental.

Schrader regards the sparse as indicative of both character

development along a spiritual path, and to cinematic construction. I have taken
issue with Schrader's application of this theory on character development, and
hope that I have demonstrated that, in this regard, it does not always hold true.
However, concerning cinematic construction, the sparse means of minimalism do
allow for the essence of the story and its characters to emerge. While abundant
means are used to sustain audience interest (suspension of disbelief) this is done
while rejecting the empathetic rationale for that interest, in order to set up a new
priority.

Schrader 32 suggests that indeed film is particularly well-suited for

pointing to the transcendental, since film is the most realistic of artistic media,
and therefore a departure from this (i.e. Hartley’s minimalism and
circumvention of the superfluous) presents perhaps the greatest means of
signifying the transcendent. As a whole, then, Hal Hartley's film aptly displays
this kind of cinematic sparseness, and in doing so exemplifies the transcendental
and essential qualities of his characters and story, without sacrificing a
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significant emphasis on the embodied, existential attributes of encountering a
world filled with monsters, saints, and the miraculous.
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